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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 09-3459 
___________ 
  
 
YING CHEN; 
QIANG CHEN, 
                                                           Petitioners 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A075-710-413 & A089-252-003) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Argued February 14, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, HARDIMAN and  
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 18, 2011) 
_________ 
 
Yee Ling Poon   (Argued) 
Law Offices of Yee Ling Poon, LLC 
New York, New York 10038 
 
 Attorney for Petitioners 
 2 
 
Jacob A. Bashyrov 
Linda Y. Cheng 
Katharine Clark   (Argued) 
Eric H. Holder, Jr. 
Thomas W. Hussey 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ying Chen and her husband Qiang Chen (collectively, 
“petitioners”) seek review of a final removal order entered by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  At issue is the 
frequently encountered issue of asylum for the Chinese 
parents of American born children whose birth exceeds the 
maximum under China‟s population control rules. 
 
 Mr. Chen, a native and citizen of China, Fujian 
Province, entered the United States in 1996 without 
inspection.  Ms. Chen, also from China, Fujian Province, 
entered in 2003 without inspection.  The couple married here 
in 2005 and have had two sons, born in 2005 and 2008, both 
United States citizens.  In 2008, after the Department of 
Homeland Security served Notices to Appear, petitioners 
conceded their removability before an Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”).  They applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief, and, 
alternatively, voluntary departure.  Petitioners – principally 
Ms. Chen, the lead applicant and sole witness to testify before 
the IJ – claim that they fear persecution upon return to China 
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for having violated the one-child policy in that Ms. Chen will 
be forcibly sterilized and/or face economic persecution.
1
 
 
 The IJ denied relief.  Among other things, the IJ found 
that Ms. Chen‟s stated desire to have a third child upon return 
to China is speculative, and that, under the holding in Matter 
of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), she failed to show 
a well-founded fear that she would be forcibly sterilized upon 
returning with her two United States citizen children.  The IJ 
also denied withholding of removal and found no evidence 
showing a likelihood that Ms. Chen will be subjected to 
torture upon return.   
 
 Petitioners filed a motion with the IJ to reopen the 
record and for reconsideration.  They submitted an affidavit 
from an aunt of Ms. Chen, who stated that she was forcibly 
sterilized upon returning to China with two children that she 
had while in Japan.  The IJ denied petitioners‟ motion, noting 
that they had ample opportunity to present all evidence at the 
merits hearing, and that the evidence from the aunt was 
available and could have been presented previously.   
 
 The BIA affirmed and dismissed petitioners‟ appeal, 
finding that petitioners failed to show an objective, well-
founded fear of persecution.  The BIA agreed with the IJ that 
petitioners do not warrant asylum based on the birth of their 
two children, and it rejected petitioners‟ efforts to distinguish 
their case from Matter of J-W-S-.  The BIA rejected, in 
particular, the argument that petitioners‟ children will be 
considered Chinese citizens for purposes of enforcing 
population control policy.  The BIA also affirmed the IJ‟s 
decision to reject, for lack of authentication, a letter that Ms. 
Chen‟s mother purportedly had obtained from the local 
Village Committee which indicated that Ms. Chen would be 
sterilized upon return.  Further, the BIA found no evidence to 
support petitioners‟ claim that they may suffer economic 
persecution, and it held that Ms. Chen had failed to show that 
                                              
1
  Ms. Chen also claimed before the IJ that she fears 
that the Chinese government will persecute her for having left 
illegally with help from a smuggler, but she has not pursued 
that contention before this Court. 
 
 4 
 
she is likely to be tortured, either because she gave birth to 
two children or because she illegally emigrated.  Finally, the 
BIA denied petitioners‟ request for a remand so that the IJ 
could consider evidence regarding the aunt‟s sterilization, 
holding that the IJ properly refused to reopen the proceedings 
to consider evidence that was previously available.  
Petitioners timely filed a petition for review in this Court. 
 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Our 
review is of the BIA‟s decision, although we also review the 
IJ‟s decision to the extent that the BIA adopted or deferred to 
the IJ‟s analysis.  Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  “We review factual findings, including findings 
of persecution and fear of persecution, under the substantial 
evidence standard.”  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 251 
(3d Cir. 2009).  “Under this deferential standard, findings of 
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 Petitioners argue that Ms. Chen established that her 
fear of future persecution is well-founded.  They contend that 
the BIA and the IJ engaged in “generic reliance” on the 
holding in Matter of J-W-S- and failed to consider evidence 
showing that petitioners‟ children will be treated as Chinese 
citizens, which gives rise to their fear that Ms. Chen will be 
sterilized or subjected to onerous fines for having had more 
than one child.  Petitioners‟ Br. at 24. 
 
The BIA‟s recent opinion in Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-
Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209 (BIA 2010), contains a 
comprehensive discussion that persuasively addresses many 
of the issues before us.  This court has not previously 
considered in a precedential opinion the BIA‟s latest view of 
this issue. 
 
The respondents there, like the Chens here, were 
natives and citizens of China who hailed from the Fujian 
Province and had two United States citizen children.  Id. at 
210.  They claimed that if they returned to China, and 
specifically the Fujian Province, the female respondent would 
be subject to forced sterilization as well as a significant fine.  
Id.  The IJ agreed and granted the respondent‟s application for 
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asylum.  Id.  The BIA vacated the opinion of the IJ, 
concluding that the respondent had not shown that she 
possessed a well-founded fear of forcible sterilization or other 
sanctions rising to the level of persecution.  Id. at 218. 
 
 In doing so, the BIA noted that State Department 
reports on country conditions, including the Profiles of 
Asylum Claims & Country Conditions, are “highly probative 
evidence and are usually the best source of information on 
conditions in foreign nations.”  Id. at 213.  With respect to the 
discussion of forced sterilization in China and Fujian 
Province in particular, in the May 2007 China: Profile of 
Asylum Claims and Country Conditions (“2007 Profile”), the 
BIA stated: 
 
Although acknowledging that there were “reportedly” 
forced sterilizations in Fujian in 2006, the State 
Department observes that Consulate General officials 
visiting Fujian have found that coercion through public 
and other pressure has been used, but they did not find 
any cases of physical force employed in connection 
with abortion or sterilization.  In interviews with visa 
applicants from Fujian representing a wide cross-
section of society, Consulate General officers have 
noted that many violators of the one-child policy paid 
fines, but they found no evidence of forced abortion or 
property confiscation.  According to the Fujian 
Provincial Birth Planning Committee, there have been 
no cases of forced abortion or sterilization in Fujian in 
the last 10 years.    
 
Id. at 214 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 Similarly, with respect to the 2007 Profile discussion 
regarding the economic sanctions that might be imposed, the 
BIA stated:
 2
 
                                              
2
 Although here the Government at oral argument 
acknowledged that the 2007 Profile was not submitted into 
evidence, we agree that the BIA considered the 2007 Profile 
by citing to Matter of J-W-S- and did not err in doing so.  The 
BIA may take administrative notice of official documents 
prepared by the Department of State, such as the 2007 Profile.  
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The State Department‟s 2007 Profile indicates that an 
economic penalty in the form of a social compensation 
fee may be imposed upon a birth planning violator. 
However, the respondent has not met her burden of 
establishing that payment of such a fee would put her 
at such a “severe economic disadvantage” that it would 
amount to persecution.  The 2007 Profile indicates that 
there is wide variation in the amount of social 
compensation fees and the severity of hardship they 
impose for out-of-plan births.  It also notes that 
couples unable to pay the fee immediately may be 
allowed to pay in installments.    
 
Id. at 216 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 In sum, the BIA in Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- 
concluded that the evidence presented “indicates that physical 
coercion to achieve compliance with family planning goals is 
uncommon and unsanctioned by China‟s national laws and 
that the overall policy is much more heavily reliant on 
incentives and economic penalties.”  Id. at 218.  With regard 
to those incentives and penalties, the BIA held that “the 
respondent has not shown that her locality represents a 
current exception to the general rules in which the Chinese 
Government relies on a variety of measures short of 
persecution to enforce its population control policy.”  Id.   
 
 With Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- in mind, we find 
substantial evidence in the record here to support the denial of 
asylum.  To establish eligibility for asylum, petitioners had to 
prove either past persecution (which they have not claimed) 
or “a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a 
statutorily enumerated ground.”  Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y 
Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2010).  A “well-founded 
fear” must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable.  
Id. at 108.  To establish objective reasonableness, petitioners 
must show that “a reasonable person in the alien‟s 
circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [China].”  
                                                                                                     
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); BIA: Procedural Reforms to 
Improve Case Mgmt., 67 Fed. Reg., 54,878, 54,892 (Aug. 26, 
2002). 
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Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003).  “„A 
person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be 
forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary 
sterilization or is subject to persecution for failure, refusal, or 
resistance to undergo such a procedure shall be deemed to 
have a well founded fear of persecution on account of 
political opinion.‟”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 
(3d Cir. 2008) (alterations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(B)). 
 
 The BIA agreed with the IJ‟s analysis and found that 
the birth of petitioners‟ two children does not warrant asylum, 
citing both this Court‟s decision in Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 
346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that substantial evidence 
supported determination that petitioners failed to show that 
fear of sterilization was objectively reasonable), and its own 
decision in Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 189-90 
(rejecting evidence that petitioner had well-founded fear of 
forcible sterilization based on returning to China with U.S. 
born children).  Contrary to petitioners‟ suggestion, the BIA 
and the IJ did not ignore their evidence or fail to conduct a 
case-specific analysis of the evidence.
3
  Moreover, the record 
                                              
3
 Petitioners cite Zheng, in support of their argument 
that the agency‟s analysis of the evidence was insufficient.  In 
Zheng, this Court granted an alien‟s petition for review where 
“the BIA did little more than quote passages from its earlier 
decision in J-W-S- without identifying-let alone discussing-
the various statements contained in the record before it that 
[petitioner] submitted in support of his motion to reopen.”  
549 F.3d at 268.  Here, the IJ sufficiently considered the 
relevant documents and evidence of record.  For example, on 
the central question of whether petitioners‟ children will be 
considered Chinese citizens for family planning purposes, the 
IJ expressly discussed and analyzed the State Department 
Report, the Law Library of Congress Report, a Chinese 
passport issued to petitioners‟ eldest child, evidence regarding 
China‟s nationality laws, a purported notice from the local 
Village Committee, letters from Ms. Chen‟s female relatives 
and others, and Ms. Chen‟s testimony.  The BIA expressly 
agreed with the IJ‟s analysis of this evidence and stated that it 
was likewise unpersuaded that petitioners were entitled to 
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supports the finding that Ms. Chen does not have a well-
founded fear of future persecution. 
 
 The IJ cited evidence in the record from the State 
Department Reports and a Law Library of Congress Report 
indicating that petitioners‟ children will not be considered 
Chinese nationals upon return.  As we have explained, “State 
Department reports may constitute substantial evidence.”  Yu, 
513 F.3d at 349.  The BIA expressly rejected petitioners‟ 
efforts to distinguish the evidence in their case from Matter of 
J-W-S- and Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247 (BIA 
2007), and was not persuaded that petitioners‟ children will 
be considered Chinese citizens.
4
  Petitioners have not shown 
that the record compels a contrary finding.  Nor do petitioners 
challenge the IJ‟s finding that their stated desire to have a 
third child upon return to China is “speculative” and 
insufficient to warrant relief.  Given the record, we cannot 
disturb the finding that Ms. Chen failed to establish an 
objective, well-founded fear of forcible sterilization. 
 
 Petitioners also challenge the finding that they failed to 
establish that Ms. Chen will be subjected to fines rising to the 
level of persecution.  They argue that “[e]vidence suggests 
that Ms. Chen will face onerous fines, either to compel 
sterilization or in addition to sterilization.”  Petitioners‟ Br. at 
43.  The BIA noted that petitioners had failed to provide any 
                                                                                                     
relief.  We are satisfied that petitioners‟ evidence was 
meaningfully considered. 
 
4
 Although Chen argues that a 2003 administrative 
opinion from the Fujian Province and a 2003 Department of 
State Consular Information Sheet on China support her claim 
that her United States-born children would be counted for 
local family planning purposes, there was substantial 
evidence in the record to support the contrary conclusion.  
Moreover, we agree with the Government that “[e]ven if [the 
Chens] showed evidence compelling the contrary conclusion 
that their United States citizen children would be considered 
Chinese nationals, [the Chens] have not shown an objectively 
reasonable well-founded fear of sterilization in China based 
on the record.”  Respondent‟s Br. at 23. 
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evidence as to their individual financial circumstances, and it 
found that they had failed carry their burden to prove 
economic restraints so severe as to constitute persecution.  
Substantial evidence supports these findings.  For example, 
the 2007 State Department Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for China, upon which petitioners rely, reflects a 
variation in the amount of social compensation fees and the 
severity of hardship that the Chinese government imposes for 
a violation of family planning policy.  Thus, while we have 
held that the “the deliberate imposition of severe economic 
disadvantage which threatens a petitioner‟s life or freedom 
may constitute persecution,” Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 
168 (3d Cir. 2005), the record here does not compel a finding 
that Ms. Chen herself faces the prospect of fines that will rise 
to this level. 
 
 Petitioners also argue that the BIA and the IJ erred in 
rejecting as unauthenticated the notice from Ms. Chen‟s 
Village Committee.  According to petitioners, the notice, 
which was purportedly obtained by Ms. Chen‟s mother, 
establishes to a reasonable probability that Ms. Chen will be 
forcibly sterilized in her local community, and she suggests 
that her credible testimony alone sufficed to authenticate the 
document.  The BIA, however, properly observed that the 
Village Committee document had not been authenticated by 
any means at all, such as an affidavit from Ms. Chen‟s mother 
as to how the document was obtained.  Thus, the IJ properly 
discounted the document.  Further, the BIA properly applied 
the rule that, “even where an applicant is credible, 
corroboration may be required if the applicant is to meet her 
burden of proof.”  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d 
Cir. 2005).    
 
 In short, we discern no reversible error in the denial of 
petitioners‟ claims for asylum.  Because withholding of 
removal carries a higher burden of proof than asylum, the 
request for withholding was properly denied, as well.  See 
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Finally, 
because petitioners do not challenge the denial of CAT relief 
in their brief before this Court, we deem that issue waived 
and do not address it.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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We have considered whether our recent decision in 
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010), warrants a 
remand of this matter to the BIA, but we conclude that it does 
not.  In Huang, the BIA reversed an IJ‟s decision to grant 
asylum based on a finding that the petitioner had an 
objectively well-founded fear that she would be forcibly 
sterilized upon returning to China with her two children born 
in the United States.  This Court observed that, in reversing 
the IJ‟s determination that Huang‟s fear was well-founded, 
the BIA had “failed to address any evidence [of record] that, 
if credited, would lend support to Huang‟s asserted fear of 
sterilization, and thus [the BIA] decision does not reflect a 
consideration of the record as a whole.”  Id. at 388.  We noted 
that, “[w]hile we are not suggesting that the BIA must discuss 
every piece of evidence mentioned by an asylum applicant, it 
may not ignore evidence favorable to the alien.”  Id.  
Consequently, because the BIA‟s analysis in Huang did “little 
more than cherry-pick a few pieces of evidence, state why 
that evidence does not support a well-founded fear of 
persecution, and conclude that Huang‟s asylum petition 
therefore lacks merit,” we remanded for the BIA to conduct a 
proper review and to determine from the evidence of record 
whether there is a reasonable possibility of forced sterilization 
and whether Huang‟s fear is objectively reasonable.  Id.  
 
In the present case, we do not find a similar flaw in the 
agency‟s analysis.  As discussed, the IJ sufficiently 
considered the relevant documents and evidence of record.  
Unlike Huang, where “the BIA discussed none of [the record] 
evidence” suggesting that Huang might face forced 
sterilization upon return to China, id., the BIA here stated that 
it had considered the evidence that petitioners submitted in an 
effort to distinguish their case from Matter of J-W-S-, but it 
agreed with the IJ‟s analysis and finding that petitioners‟ 
evidence was unpersuasive and insufficient to warrant relief.  
Further, the record here does not reflect that the agency 
“ignor[ed] evidence favorable to the alien,” Huang, 620 F.3d 
at 388; rather, the IJ and the BIA considered petitioners‟ 
evidence but rejected it on the ground that it did not establish 
an objectively well-founded fear of forcible sterilization.  
Given this record, and given that substantial evidence in the 
record supports the agency determination, we conclude that a 
remand of this matter is unwarranted. 
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We have also considered petitioners‟ remaining 
arguments (including their challenge to the denial of the 
motions to reopen and remand so that they could present 
evidence from Ms. Chen‟s aunt – evidence that the BIA fairly 
characterized as “previously available”), but we find those 
arguments without merit and in need of no separate 
discussion. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
